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A CRY FOR REFORM IN CONSTRUING WASHINGTON
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION STATUTES-Chemical Bank v.
Washington Public Power Supply System, 99 Wn. 2d 772, 666 P.2d
329 (1983).
In Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS),I the Washington Supreme Court invalidated a participants'

agreement among municipal corporations 2 for joint development of nuclear power plants. The supreme court held that the agreement was void
and unenforceable against Washington cities, towns, and public utility
districts 3 because these municipal corporations had no authority to enter
4
into the participants' agreement.
This Note examines Chemical Bank and its application of Washington
municipal corporation law. The Note briefly identifies Washington municipal corporation law prior to Chemical Bank and considers how Chemical Bank relates to this prior law. The Note then discusses some of the
negative impacts the decision will have on municipal corporations, the
courts, and the legislature. Finally, the Note concludes with recommendations for legislative and judicial action to limit the scope of Chemical
Bank and provide a more reasonable approach to municipal corporation
law.

1. 99 Wn. 2d 772,799, 666 P.2d 329, 343 (1983).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the term "municipal corporation" is used in its broadest sense.
Broadly defined, the term "municipal corporation" is applied to any public local corporation exercising some function of government. I E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.07a
(3d ed. 1971); see Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wn. 2d 550, 554, 304 P.2d 656, 659 (1956).
However, in the strict and technically proper sense of the word, "municipal corporation" does not
include agencies that are created by the legislature for specific and limited purposes and therefore are
labelled "quasi-municipal corporations." See Columbia Irrigation Dist. v. Benton County, 149
Wash. 234, 239, 270 P. 813, 816 (1928). This Note includes "quasi-municipal corporations" in the
general term "municipal corporation."
3. The supreme court's ruling applied only to the approximately 70% share of project capability
owned by Washington city, town, and public utility district participants. C. Luce, E. Carlson & H.
Schwab, Recommendations for Solutions to the Major Problems Involving, or Arising from the
Washington Public Power Supply System-A Report to Governor John Spellman of Washington and
Governor Victor Atiyeh of Oregon app. 2 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Luce Report]. After the
Chemical Bank ruling, however, a Washington superior court held that the participants' agreement
was invalid for the remaining 60 utilities. The superior court based its decision on (1) indivisibility of
obligation, (2) mutual mistake, (3) frustration, and (4) impracticability. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS,
No. 82-2-06840-3, slip op. (King County Superior Court Aug. 1I, 1983), appeal argued, No.
49868-7 (Washington Supreme Court Mar. 26, 1984); see also Luce Report, supra, app. 7, at 4.9.
4. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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OUTLINE OF RELEVANT WASHINGTON MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW
The Washington Supreme Court has held that municipal corporations

have no inherent right to self-government. 5 Therefore, municipal corporation powers arise from two sources in Washington: the state constitution
and state statutes. 6 The following analysis briefly identifies discernible
trends in Washington municipal corporation law and describes the rules

of construction that the Washington courts traditionally have applied to
sources of municipal authority.
A.

Rules for ConstruingConstitutionalMunicipal CorporationHome
Rule Authority

The Washington Supreme Court narrowly construed municipal home
rule powers in its early decisions. 7 The state constitution is the primary
source of home rule powers in Washington: it grants cities of over 10,000
inhabitants the power to frame their own charters, 8 and it allows counties,
cities, and towns to take police power actions not in conflict with general
laws. 9 Despite these provisions, the court narrowly interpreted municipal
home rule powers and held that home rule did not authorize municipal
corporations to act in conflict with state statutes, and that home rule could
be preempted by legislative enactments. 10
In instances where the legislature had not clearly foreclosed or

preempted municipal action, the court developed a test that allowed some
5.
6.

State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 527, 118 P. 639, 640 (1911).
City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., 90 Wn. 2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784, 786 (1978); I C. AN-

TIEAU. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 5.02 (Jan. 1984 rev.); 2 E. MCQUILLIN. supra note 2. § 10.03:
Mack, The Powers of Municipal Corporations, in DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 45,

62 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n 1976). See generally Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH- L. REV. 743 (1963).
7. Home rule can be defined generally as the power of municipal corporations to provide for their
own affairs. The extent of home rule powers varies from state to state and is constantly changing. See
generally I C. ANTIEAU. supra note 6, ch. 3; 0. REYNOLDS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35 (1982):

C. RHYNE. MUNICIPAL LAW § 4-3 (1957); Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in The United
States. 10 WMh & MARY L. REV 269 (1968).
8. WASH. CONST art. X1, § 10.

9. Id.§ 11.
10. InreCloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 139-40, 27 P. 1064, 1065-66(1891).
In some states home rule has been construed as a limit on the powers of the state legislature as well
as a grant of municipal power. Sandalow, The Limits ofMunicipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 MINN L. REV. 643, 648 (1964). The Washington Supreme Court has held that
home rule does not immunize municipal corporations from legislative interference in their local affairs. E.g.. Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wn. 2d 550, 554, 304 P. 2d 656, 659 (1956); Andersen. Resolving State/Local Governmental Conflict-A Tale of Three Cities. 18 URB L. ANN 129.
130 (1980): see Brachtenbach, Home Rule in Washington-At the Whim of the Legislature, 29 WASH
L. REV 295, 298 (1954).

Washington Municipal Corporation Law
home rule power. Cities, counties, and towns were held to have authority
to exercise home rule powers affecting purely local affairs,1 1 but were
held to have no authority to act where the state had a jointl2 or paramount 1 3 interest in the activities. The practical effect of this approach was
that municipal corporations were subordinate to the legislature in any
matter upon which the legislature had acted. 14 However, prior to Chemical Bank, the court had begun to replace this rigid local-joint-paramount
interest approach with a test that allowed the court to balance the interests
of the state and the municipal corporation. 15
B.

Rules for ConstruingSources ofExpress andImplied Municipal
CorporationAuthority

In general, the Washington Supreme Court has narrowly construed the
statutory powers of municipal corporations. 16 In some of its earliest decisions, the court adopted the narrow, nineteenth-century approach to municipal corporation powers summarized by "Dillon's Rule.' 1 7 Under
Dillon's Rule, municipal corporations are limited to: (1) powers that are
provided in express terms, (2) powers that are necessarily or fairly implied from the express terms, and (3) powers that are essential to the purposes of the municipal corporation; any doubt regarding the existence of
local authority should be decided against the municipal corporation. 18
Within this narrow approach, the supreme court developed further tests
and rules of construction for interpreting the various sources of municipal
!1. E.g., Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958)
(except as restricted by the legislature, the powers of first class cities are as broad as the legislature's
powers); Detamore v. Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 326-27, 145 P. 462, 463 (1915) (within its limits,
WASH. CONsT. art. XI, § I1 delegates as much police power to cities as that possessed by the legislature); see also I C. AmlaEu. supra note 6, § 3.03.
12. Massie v. Brown, 84 Wn. 2d 490, 492, 527 P.2d 476, 477 (1974) (when the state's interest
is paramount to, or joint with, that of the municipal corporation, the corporation has no power to act
without delegation from the legislature).
13. E.g., City of Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 566, 94 P.2d 180, 181 (1939) (when the
state has asserted its jurisdiction over a subject, local ordinances must give way).
14. Trautman, supranote 6, at 772.
15. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huggins v. Bridges, 97 Wash. 553, 555, 166 P. 780, 781 (1917) (at
least as to municipal corporations other than first class cities, municipal powers must be examined
critically and without straining to grant an alleged power).
17. E.g., id. at 557, 166 P. at 781; Tacoma Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Tacoma, 14 Wash.
288,291,44 P. 655, 656 (1896).
18.

1 J. DILLON.COMMENTARIES ONTHE LAWOF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).

Judge Dillon, however, qualified his rule by providing that strict construction does not apply to the
mode used by a municipal corporation to carry out its grant of power. Id. § 239; see 2 E. McQUILLrN,
supra note 2, § 10.29; see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing how the court in
ChemicalBank ignored the exception to Dillon's Rule).
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corporation power. For instance, the Washington court has stated that it
looks to legislative intent in deciphering express municipal powers rather
than reading its own words into statutes. 19
The appropriate rule of construction may also hinge on one of two
other factors: (1) the type of municipal corporation involved, and (2) the
type of power exercised by the municipal corporation. In deference to the
constitutional and statutory grant of some measure of home rule authority
to first class cities,20 Dillon's requirement that doubts regarding the existence of municipal powers be resolved against the municipal corporation
has not been applied to first class cities. 2 1 Also, since code cities have all
of the powers of any other class of municipality, 22 presumably including
the powers of first class cities, the courts have liberally interpreted the
powers of code cities. 23 This more liberal approach has translated into
greater freedom and flexibility for municipal actions. Other types of municipal corporations usually have not enjoyed this liberal approach to their
municipal powers.24

The rule of construction also may differ depending upon the type of
power exercised by a given municipal corporation. In determining
whether a municipal corporation has implied authority to carry on an activity, the supreme court has examined the "necessity" of an alleged
19. E.g., Reiter v. Chapman, 177 Wash. 392, 397, 31 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1934) (courts may not
amend a statute by adding words but may refer to legislative policy in construing statutes); Shorts v.
City of Seattle, 95 Wash. 531, 535, 164 P. 239, 240 (1917) (clear legislative intent is controlling).
See generally C. RHYNE. supra note 7, § 4-12.
20. A first class city is a city having at least 20,000 inhabitants at the time of its organization or
reorganization, and which has adopted a charter for its own government in accordance with WASH
CONST. art. XI, § 10. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.01.010..22.010 (1983).
21. E.g., Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958):
State ex rel Ennis v. Superior Ct., 153 Wash. 139, 149-50, 279 P. 601, 604-05 (1929); see also
WASH REV CODE § 35.20.900 (1983).
22. WASH REV CODE § 35A. 11.020 (1983). A code city is any city or town that elects to be
classified as an optional code city under WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35A. Id. §§ 35A.01.020-.030 (1983).
23. E.g., United States v. Town of North Bonneville, 94 Wn. 2d 827. 831-32, 621 P.2d 127,
129-30 (1980).
24. In addition to the general purpose municipal corporations of counties, cities, and towns.
Washington presently has approximately 63 different types of special purpose municipal corporations. Wash. House of Representatives Local Gov't Comm., Memorandum (Apr. 3, 1978) (copy on
file with the Washington Law Review).
For strict statutory interpretation of the powers of other municipal corporations, see, e.g., Pacific
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn. 2d 347, 352, 178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947)
(resolve doubts concerning the grant of municipal power against the grant), State ex rel. Hill v. Port
of Seattle, 104 Wash. 634, 638, 177 P. 671, 673, modified, 180 P. 137 (1919) (strict interpretation of
statutes regarding port districts): State ex rel. Huggins v. Bridges, 97 Wash. 553, 555-56, 166 P.
780, 781 (1917) (same). This narrow interpretation follows from Judge Dillon's treatise, which suggested that those "'bestfitted by their intelligence, business experience, capacity, and moral character" do not hold municipal positions and that municipal affairs are conducted in an "'unwise and
extravagant" manner. I J. DILLON. THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9 at 85-86 (2d ed.
1873).
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power. 25 However, the court has applied different versions of the necessity test depending upon the type of municipal power being interpreted.
The court normally has applied a liberal "reasonable necessity" test in
interpreting police power actions. 26 On the other hand, the court has usually applied a "strict necessity" test in eminent domain cases, 27 and re28
quired express authority in taxation cases.
In sum, prior to Chemical Bank, the Washington Supreme Court had
softened its narrow approach to construing the express and implied powers of municipal corporations in cases involving first class cities, code
cities, or a questioned police power action. Additionally, the court had
indicated it would look to legislative intent in determining how to construe the powers of municipal corporations.

25. When a statute provides authority to municipal corporations, all powers necessary to make
that legislation effective are generally considered included by implication. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note
6, § 5.03; 2 E. MCQUILLIN. supra note 2, § 10.12; 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55.04 (4th ed. 1973) (revision of SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION). However,
these implied powers can be strictly or liberally interpreted. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 6, §§
5.03-.04.
26. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wn. 2d 19, 29, 578 P.2d 1292, 1298
(1978) (power to contract is an implied incident to the power to distribute municipal water); Hunter v.
North Mason High School, 85 Wn. 2d 810, 817, 539 P.2d 845, 849 (1975) (power of a municipal
corporation to purchase liability insurance is implicit in its power to conduct activities requiring insurance); Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wn. 2d 446, 460, 357 P.2d 863,
872 (1960) (authority to pay for a sewer system is implied in authority to provide the system); Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wn. 2d 534, 546-47, 179 P.2d 294, 300-01 (1947) (power to hire employees contains implied authority to enter into collective bargaining); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn.
2d 545, 554, 108 P.2d 348, 352 (1940) (city has implied power to offer pension program); Hart v.
King County, 104 Wash. 485, 492, 177 P. 344, 346 (1918) (county has authority to maintain approaches to a ferry it operates); LaMon v. City of Westport, 22 Wn. App. 215, 216-17, 588 P.2d
1205, 1208 (1978) (power to purchase insurance includes the power to self-insure).
However, the court occasionally applied a more strict approach to police powers. See, e.g., Port of
Seattle v. Washington Utils. and Transp. Comm'n, 92 Wn. 2d 789, 795, 597 P.2d 383, 386 (1979)
(any doubt as to implied powers is resolved against the municipal corporation); see also City of
Spokane v. J-R Distribs., 90 Wn. 2d 722, 727, 585 P.2d 784, 786 (1978) (city has no authority to
regulate superior courts); Griggs v. Port of Tacoma, 150 Wash. 402, 409-10, 273 P. 521,524 (1928)
(port authority has no implied powers to improve waterways beyond the limits of its district); State ex
rel. Hill v. Port of Seattle, 104 Wash. 634, 641-42, 177 P. 671, 674 modified, 180 P. 137 (1919)
(port cannot build an ice plant designed to produce an amount of ice far in excess of its future needs).
27. See, e.g., In re Seattle, 96 Wn. 2d 616, 629, 638 P.2d 549, 557 (1981); see also City of
Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 66, 29 P. 847, 847-48 (1892) (only an act of the legislature can
support municipal eminent domain powers).
28. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wn. 2d 804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982)
(express statutory authority required to give counties authority to tax); Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn. 2d 347, 353, 178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947) (municipal corporations do
not possess inherent powers of taxation); Comment, Subdivision Exactionsin Washington: The Controversy OverImposingFees on Developers, 59 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1984).
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CHEMICAL BANK

In 1972, the WPPSS began a nuclear power plant construction program
to meet forecasted increases in demand for electricity. 29 In 1976, eightyeight municipal corporations 30 entered into a participants' agreement to
purchase shares of the output from two of the plants WPPSS planned to
build-WPPSS nuclear plants 4 and 5. 3 1 The agreement required the participants to pay their proportionate share of the plants' cost whether or not
32
the plants ever produced any electricity.
Construction on WPPSS plants 4 and 5 continued until 1981, when
WPPSS first suspended and then terminated the plants due to escalating
construction costs, reduced electricity demand, and an inability to sell
bonds. 33 Prior to termination, however, over $2.25 billion in revenue
bond proceeds were spent on the plants. 34 Facing responsibility for this
enormous debt, many participants questioned the enforceability of their
agreement. 35 Chemical Bank, the trustee for the bondholders, brought a
declaratory judgment action against WPPSS and the participants seeking
a determination that the participants owed WPPSS sufficient funds to ser36
vice the bonds and bond interest.
29. WPPSS is a joint operating agency established in 1957 under WASH. REV CODE ch. 43.52
(1983). WPPSS was created to allow municipal corporations to pool their resources in order to build
electric power facilities too large for the individual members to build. WPPSS members include four
Washington cities and 19 Washington public utility districts. See generally Luce Report, supra note
3.
30. The participants included municipal corporations from six western states. Chemical Bank v.
WPPSS, 99 Wn. 2d 772, 777, 666 P.2d 329, 332. Among the participants were 20 WPPSS members. Brief of Washington Public Power Supply System, No. 1 of 3,at 11,Chemical Bank.
31.
Each municipal corporation purchased a "Share of Project Capability." WPPSS, Nuclear
Projects Nos. 4 and 5 Participants' Agreement § 5 (April 15, 1976) (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review). "Project capability" was defined as:
[T]he amounts of electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of generating
at any particular time (including times when either or both of the Plants are not operable or
operating or the operation thereof is suspended, interrupted, interfered with, reduced or curtailed, in each case in whole or in part for any reason whatsoever), less Project station use and
losses.
Id. § I(v).
32. Id. § 6(d). Such contract provisions are normally referred to as "dry hole," "take-or-pay,"
or "hell-or-high water" provisions.
For a general discussion of WPPSS' financial arrangements, see CoMm ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE. REPORT ON THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND CONSERVATION
ACT (S.885), S. REP No- 976 (Part 1), 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 24-25 (1980); Luce Report, supra note
3.
33. Luce Report, supra note 3,at 10-14.
34. Luce Report, supra note 3, at 15. With interest charges included, WPPSS plants 4 and 5
"dry hole" costs exceed $7 billion. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn.2d at 778-79, 666 P.2d at 332.
35. Luce Report, supra note 3, app. 7.
36. The Chemical Bank lawsuit is not the only action arising out of the WPPSS termination of
plants 4 and 5. At least 28 other major actions have been filed dealing with WPPSS issues. Id.
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In ChemicalBank v. WPPSS, the Washington Supreme Court held that
Washington public utility districts, cities, and towns had no authority to
enter into the participants' agreement for WPPSS nuclear plants 4 and
5.37 The court found that the agreement did not provide necessary protections for ratepayers because it required the participants to pay for the
plants whether or not the plants ever produced any electricity. 38 In effect,
the Chemical Bank court placed the $2.25 billion loss associated with
WPPSS' inability to complete nuclear plants 4 and 5 on bondholders,
39
rather than on the participants and their Pacific Northwest ratepayers.
The court analyzed four sources of express municipal authority in
reaching its conclusion: (1) the general powers provisions of the statutes
governing each of the participants, 40 (2) statutes allowing municipal corporations to acquire and operate electric generating facilities, 41 (3) the
joint operating agency statutes, 42 and (4) the joint electric facility development statutes. 43 The court also discussed whether express authority
to acquire and construct electric generating facilities and provide electricity carried an implied power to pay for that service. 44 Finally, the court
examined whether the home rule powers of first class cities required a
liberal interpretation of their participation in projects such as WPPSS
plants 4 and 5.45 The court concluded that the Washington public utility
district, city, and town participants lacked authority to enter into the
46
agreement.
37. 99 Wn. 2d 772, 799, 666 P.2d 329, 343. See generally supranotes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
38. 99 Wn. 2d at 798,666 P.2d at 343.
39. The court recognized the effect a finding for the trustee, Chemical Bank, would have on
ratepayers. For example, the court noted that "[u]ltimately the ratepaying consumers of the participants would pay [the approximately $7 billion] for the nonexistent electricity." Id. at 779, 666 P.2d
at 332.
40. Id. at 782-84, 666 P.2d at 334-35. The court examined statutes governing first class cities,
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280(15) (1983), second class cities, id. § 35.23.440(44), third class cities,
id. § 35.24.290(3), towns, id. § 35.27.370(4), code cities, id. § 35A.80.010, and public utility districts, id. § 54.16.040.
41. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 784-91, 666 P.2d at 335-39. Statutes reviewed included
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 35.92.050 and 54.16.040 (1983).
42. ChemicalBank, 99 Wn. 2d at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41. The joint operating agency statutes
are found in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.52 (1983).
43. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 794-95, 666 P.2d at 341-42. The court reviewed WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 54.44 (1983).
44. ChemicalBank, 99 Wn. 2d at 791-2, 666 P.2d at 339-40.
45. Id. at 792-94, 666 P.2d at 340.
46. The decision also prompted concurring and dissenting opinions. The concurring opinion
agreed with the result reached by the majority but disagreed with the "significant control" test established by the majority. Instead, the concurring justice would have required the participants to have
actual ownership of the plants. ChemicalBank, 99 Wn. 2d at 799, 666 P.2d at 343 (Dore, J., concurring); see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
The dissent suggested that implied authority for the participants' agreement could be found in
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CHEMICAL BANK AND PRIOR LAW: INCONSISTENT
APPROACH TO AN EXTRAORDINARY PROBLEM

In Chemical Bank, the Washington Supreme Court examined applicable statutory and case law for express, implied, and home rule authority
for municipal corporations to enter into the participants' agreement.
Throughout its analysis, the court appeared to sacrifice consistency with
its earlier decisions in order to reach the politically popular result of protecting the participants, and consequently Pacific Northwest ratepayers,
from financial responsibility for WPPSS nuclear plants 4 and 5. The fol-

lowing analysis contrasts the rules of construction and tests employed
prior to ChemicalBank with those the court applied in Chemical Bank.
A.

Express Statutory Authority

The Chemical Bank court ignored several accepted rules of statutory
construction in interpreting sources of express municipal corporation au-

thority. 47 First, the court did not differentiate between the construction
given to statutes that apply to first class and code cities and statutes that
apply to other municipal entities. 48 However, failing to differentiate first
class and code cities from all other municipal corporations clearly departs
from the previously accepted approach, 49 and frustrates the expressed
legislative intent to broadly construe the statutes. 50 Under the previously
accepted approach, the general provisions pertaining to first class and
code cities would have been construed to grant broad authority-includWashington's joint operating agency statutes. Chemical Bank. 99 Wn. 2d at 810-14, 666 P.2d at
348-51 (Utter, J., dissenting).
47. See supra notes 5-28 and accompanying text.
48. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 782-84, 666 P.2d at 334-35; see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. For instance, in interpreting the participants' general powers provisions, the court
examined the authority of public utility districts in a manner similar to that used to look at the powers
of first class and code cities. 99 Wn. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 334-35. Public utility districts have
explicit authority to -'purchase ...

electric current for sale and distribution" under WASH REV CODE

§ 54.16.040 (1983). On the other hand, first class cities have the power to " [furnish] the inhabitants
[of the city] with gas or other lights." Id. § 35.22.280(15). Although the language for first class cities
appears to be broader than that granted to public utility districts, the court interpreted both statutory
provisions as a grant of authority to "buy electricity." 99 Wn. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 334-35. The
court did not use the liberal approach to interpreting the powers of first class cities set forth in its
earlier decisions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ennis v. Superior Court, 153 Wash. 139, 149, 279 P. 601, 604-05
(1929) (requiring liberal construction of the powers of first class cities); Winkenwerder v. City of
Yakima, 52 Wn. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn. 2d 545,
553, 108 P.2d 348. 351-52 (1940); State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 623, 33
P.2d 94. 96 (1934).
50. WASH- REV CODE § 35.22.900 (1983) states: "The rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter, but the same shall
be liberally construed for the purpose of carrying out the objects for which this chapter is intended."
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ing authority to furnish power to the cities' inhabitants through the participants' agreement.
Second, the court in ChemicalBank did not liberally interpret the statutes it examined, all of which involved public works. Earlier, the court
had indicated that actions involving public works usually fall within the
liberally interpreted police powers of cities, counties, and towns. 51 The
Chemical Bank court's narrow reading of municipal authority regarding
such capital-intensive activities denies municipal corporations the flexi52
bility necessary to pursue those activities.
Third, the Chemical Bank court misconstrued legislative intent when
considering possible sources of municipal authority. 53 One example is the
court's treatment of legislative intent in interpreting statutes that authorize
certain municipal corporations to construct, acquire, and operate electric
generating facilities. 54 These statutory provisions appear to grant cities
and public utility districts full and exclusive control over the electricity
produced by an electrical facility. However, the court suggested that
these statutes were evidence of legislative intent that the cities and public
utility districts must have significant control over the facilities themselves. 55 Thus, the court's analysis improperly discussed control in terms
51. See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. City of Seattle, 56 Wn. 2d 10, 15, 351 P.2d 117, 120 (1960)
(police power extends to providing sewer service); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wn. 2d 616, 625,
277 P.2d 352, 357 (1954) (police power extends to fluoridating a municipal water supply); Morse v.
Wise, 37 Wn. 2d 806, 810-11, 226 P.2d 214, 216 (1951) (police power includes authority to provide
sewer service); Elliott v. City of Leavenworth, 197 Wash. 427, 435, 85 P.2d 1053, 1054-55 (1938)
(constitutional provision delimiting police powers applies to a city's sewage disposal project); Smith
v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 221, 104 P. 249, 250 (1909) (garbage control is within the police
powers of a city). However, eminent domain and taxation actions-fall outside of the scope of police
power.
For discussion of the court's usual liberal interpretation of police powers, see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
52. Public works, such as electric generating facilities, water works, and sewer systems, require
long-range planning, years of construction, and great sums of money. Police powers involving public
works are normally interpreted liberally because flexible statutory schemes and rules of interpretation
are most conducive to efficient building of such facilities. See Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 810, 666
P.2d at 348 (Utter, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 92-94 discussing problems with raising capital
under strict statutory interpretation.
53. Although the court discusses statutes involving the powers of first class cities, the court does
not address expressions of legislative intent as to these statutes. See Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at
782-84, 666 P.2d at 334-35.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's earlier emphasis on using
legislative intent in construing statutes regarding municipal corporations.
54. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 784-91, 666 P.2d at 335-39. The court specifically examined
WASH.REv. CODE §§ 35.92.050 (1983) (powers of cities and towns) and 54.16.040 (powers of public
utility districts).
55. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337. The court noted that it might have
upheld the participants' agreement if the participants had maintained control over a project equal to
an ownership interest. Id. at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
The court determined that a contract providing for "project capability" does not equal ownership.
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of electrical projects, rather than in terms of the electricity produced.

56

Further, the analysis does not address other expressions of legislative intent 57 or the legislative mandate that cities and towns should be allowed to
provide for the general welfare of their citizens. 58
The court also gave insufficient weight to legislative intent in its analysis of Washington's joint operating agency statutes. 59 Ignoring the legislative declaration requiring broad construction, 60 the court used strict
Id. at 785. 666 P.2d at 336. However, as noted by the dissent, the question of whether a contract for
Iproject capability" is a form of ownership deserves further attention. Although the participants
clearly did not own the power plants, they did "own" something of value-the possibility of future
power. Id. at 810-11, 666 P.2d at 349 (Utter, J.,dissenting). Thus, it can be argued that an ownership interest attaches to "project capability" contracts. Further, the court's factual determination that
the participants did not have significant control over the projects is interesting because the lower court
made no factual finding about the degree of control exercised by the participants. Rather than referring the question of significant control back to the lower court for a factual determination, the court
made its own decision on this point. Finally, the court suggested as an afterthought that the legislature
intended that there be significant control over energy facilities. The court cited the provisions of
WASH. REV- CODE §§ 35.92.050 and 54.16.040 (1983) as support.
The overriding rationale for the court's significant control requirement appears to be a public policy argument that the risk to ratepayers of project failure must be balanced by ownership or significant
control. See 99 Wn. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337. To achieve this end the court seemed willing to
stretch existing municipal corporation doctrine.
56. As the Court stated, cities and public utility districts have " 'full and exclusive authority to
sell and regulate and control the use, distribution, rates, service, charges, and price thereof.' " 99
Wn. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337 (referring to WASH REV. CODE §§ 35.92.050, 54.16.040 (1983)).
However, in the context of the remainder of the statute, it is clear that the provision properly applies
only to the electricity produced by the electric facility rather than the facility itself. Therefore, the
court's suggestion that the legislature intended municipal corporations to have significant control over
their electrical projects is not bome out by the court's supporting authority.
57. Other indications that the legislature intended municipal corporations to have a great deal of
latitude in their approaches to energy facilities include WASH REV CODE § 54.44.010 (1983), which
al lows for joint development of energy facilities "as one means of achieving economies of scale and
thereby promoting the economic development of the state .... " (emphasis added). This statute
suggests that the legislature intended that there be other means of providing electricity to the citizens
of municipal corporations.
58. In its discussion of the powers of the participants, the court identified some of these statutes:
WASH REV. CODE §§ 35.22.280(15), 35.23.440(44), 35.24.290(3), 35.27.370(4), 35A.80.010,
43.52.410, 54.16.040 (1983). Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 782-83, 666 P.2d at 334-35. There are
also specific statutory mandates to cities and towns to provide for their citizens' general welfare. For
instance, WASH REV. CODE § 35.27.370(16) (1983) permits towns to take actions "as may be
deemed expedient to maintain the.., welfare of the town.., and to do and perform any and all other
acts and things necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter." See also id. §§
35.22.280(35), 35.23.440(1), (55), 35.24.290(17). "The purpose of a general welfare clause in a
statute is to extend the powers of a municipality beyond those specifically enumerated to other things
which are necessary to accomplish the purposes of municipal government." C. RHYNE. supra note 7,
§ 4-8; see also 3 C. SANDS. supra note 25, § 64.02 (legislation authorizing municipal corporations to
regulate the public health, convenience, and welfare should be broadly construed).
59. Joint operating agencies are municipal corporations that exist for the purpose of generating
electricity and that consist of two or more cities or public utility districts. WASH. REV CODE ch. 43.52
(1983).
60. Id. § 43.52.910 provides that "[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate its

Washington Municipal Corporation Law
construction to draw a tenuous distinction between the powers of a joint
operating agency and the powers of its participants. The court found that
joint operating agencies have broad authority to contract with any municipal corporation or public utility relating to electric power, presumably
including authority to sell project capability. 6 1 But the court held that an
62
agency's participants' authority is limited to purchasing electric energy.
Such analysis suggests that the legislature authorized joint operating
agencies to sell more than electric power to cities and public utility districts, while authorizing the cities and public utility districts to buy only
electric power. A more reasonable interpretation is that the legislature authorized joint operating agencies, cities, and public utility districts to buy
and sell the same thing. Therefore, the court probably misconstrued the
63
legislature's intent.
In departing from liberal rules of construction regarding express statutory authority, the court has reduced the flexibilty of municipal corporations in dealing with their needs and problems. In addition, the Chemical
Bank decision makes uncertain which rules of construction should be applied to municipal law problems in the future. 64
B.

Implied StatutoryAuthority

Instead of applying liberal rules of construction to the question of implied statutory authority, 65 the ChemicalBank court narrowly interpreted
the police power statutes it examined. The court relied on a taxation decision to hold that the test for implied powers is "legal necessity,' '66 rather
than the more liberal "fairly implied" or "reasonableness" test, which

purposes." The lower court took special note of this legislative mandate to liberally construe the joint
operating agency statutes. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, No. 82-2-006840-3, slip op. at 23 (King
County Super. Ct. Oct. 15 1982), rev'd, 99 Wn. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
61. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41. The court based this finding on a
provision of WASH. REV. CODE that allows joint operating agencies "tocontract with any municipal
corporation or public utility 'for any term relating to the purchase, sale, interchange or wheeling of
power.' "Id. at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52.391 (1983)).
62. Id. at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41. For this holding the court interpreted WASH. REV. CODE §
43.52.410 (1983), which allows cities and public utility districts to contract for "the purchase and
sale of electric energy or falling waters."
63. The court also made no attempt, as required in its earlier decisions, to harmonize this apparent conflict in the statute. See, e.g., McGill v. Hedges, 62 Wash. 274, 277, 113 P. 635, 636 (1911).
Using the liberal rule of interpretation required by the legislature, see supra note 60, the court should
have found that the participants had broad powers to contract in this area.
64. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 792, 666 P.2d at 339-40 (citing HillisHomes, 97 Wn. 2d 804,
650 P.2d 193 (1982)).
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the court had stressed in its earlier police power decisions. 67 Cases involving the power to tax are distinguishable, however, from police power
cases because of the different constitutional provisions controlling the
two areas. While the Washington Constitution strictly limits taxation
powers, 68 it grants cities and towns great latitude over police power actions. 69 Although a strict necessity test may be proper for taxation cases,
a more liberal approach should continue to be used in reviewing police
power actions.
Further, the court did not rely on any decisions in cases in which, as in
Chemical Bank, the municipal corporation clearly had authority to provide a service and the question before the court was the proper method for
financing the service. 70 In analyzing the Chemical Bank situation, the
court distinguished case law on point, such as Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle (Metro).7 1 In Metro, the court held that if a
municipal corporation is authorized to provide a service, there is an implied power to pay for the facilities needed to provide the service. 72 The
Chemical Bank court distinguished Metro because, unlike Chemical
Bank, it involved a conditional revenue pledge, and because the municipal corporation in Metro maintained ownership of the facilities needed to
provide the service. 73 However, the differences between Chemical Bank
and Metro are much less evident than the differences between Chemical
74
Bank and the case law that the court applied.
67.

E.g., Pacific County v. Sherwood Pac., 17 Wn. App. 790, 794, 567 P.2d 642, 647 (1977)

(" a statute expressly granting general authority to achieve a lawful objective includes by implication

the right to do such acts as may be reasonably necessary to achieve that objective"); see the examples
discussed supra in note 26. See generally discussion of Dillon's Rule supra note 18 and accompanying text.
68. WASH CONST. art. VII, § 5 (no tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law); id. art. VII, §
9 (legislature may vest the power of taxation in municipal corporations); id. art. XI, § 12 (legislature
may vest municipal corporations with taxation powers). The court has interpreted this provision to
require express statutory authority. E.g., Hillis Homes. 97 Wn. 2d 804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195
(1982).
69. WASH. CONST. art. Xl, § 11, provides that "[a]ny county, city, town or township may make
and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws." This is a more direct grant of authority than that found in the taxation area. The
supreme court has held that § 11 is effective without legislative enactment. Patton v. City of Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 570, 38 P.2d 364, 365 (1934).
70. See Chemical Bank. 99 Wn. 2d at 792, 666 P.2d at 339-40 (listing decisions on which the
court relied).
71. 57 Wn. 2d 446, 460, 357 P.2d 863, 872 (1960) (included within the power to provide a
sewer system is the implied power to pay for it).
72. Id. at 460, 357 P.2d at 872. The lower court in Chemical Bank relied on Metro in its decision
to uphold the participants' agreements. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, No. 82-2-006840-3, slip op. at
25-26 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 15 1982), rev'd, 99 Wn. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
73. Chemical Bank. 99 Wn. 2d at 791-92, 666 P.2d at 339.
74. Contrast the holding in Metro, involving a police power action in many respects similar to
Chemical Bank. with the taxation, condemnation, and police power decisions on which the court
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In Chemical Bank, the court reasoned that practical necessities and
"reasonableness" tests play no part in analysis of implied statutory powers-including situations involving the means of accomplishing an authorized activity. In this respect, the court was being even more restrictive
than the already narrow nineteenth- century approach espoused by Judge
Dillon. 75 Under the narrow approach, if a given activity were authorized,
municipal corporations could decide how to carry out the activity. 76 The
Chemical Bank decision denies municipal corporations the power to determine the means they will use to provide an authorized service to their
citizens. This extreme limitation on implied statutory authority creates
uncertainties that will burden municipal corporations, the courts, and the
legislature. 77
C.

Local Self-Government

In ChemicalBank, the Washington Supreme Court re-embraced a narrow approach to local government home rule. 78 The court's approach provided that a municipal corporation has no authority to act using home rule
powers when the state interest in an activity is paramount to-or joint
with-that of the municipal corporation. 79 However, this approach igactually relied. In addition to Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wn. 2d 804, 650 P.2d
193 (1982), the court relied on three other decisions in holding that implied powers were to be narrowly construed. The first was a case involving municipal condemnation actions, In re Seattle, 96
Wn. 2d 616,638 P.2d 549 (1981). Second was a police power action in which the municipal corporation involved had violated explicit statutory provisions, Edwards v. Renton, 67 Wn. 2d 598, 409
P.2d 153 (1965). Finally, the court used a case in which the municipal corporation had no clear
authority to engage in the desired activity, Port of Seattle v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n,
92 Wn. 2d 789,597 P.2d 383 (1979).
75. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (Dillon's Rule).
76. Although Judge Dillon argued for strict construction of statutes relating to municipal corporations, he also suggested that exceptions should be made in some instances. Dillon suggested that
the mode chosen by a municipal corporation to carry out its authorized powers should be liberally
construed. 11. DILLON. supra note 18, § 237; see 2 E. McQUILLIN. supra note 2, § 10.29. The mode
of carrying out an activity should be interpreted to include the type of contract and financial arrangements used by municipal corporations.
77. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
78. Chemical Bank, 99 Wn. 2d at 793, 666 P.2d at 340.
79. Id. The court adopted the analysis of Washington case law as set forth in Trautman, supra
note 6, at 772. However, the court did not address the significant problems Professor Trautman identified with the court's historical approach. Id. at 768-71. Nor did the court discuss Professor Trautman's suggestion that first class cities are an exception to the narrow construction rule: "The rule of
resolving doubts against municipalities does not apply to those [cities] of the first class. This is of
particular consequence when a statute grants power to a charter city on a matter of primary state
concern or ofjoint state-local concern .... "Id. at 774. Instead of using Professor Trautman's article
as authority for broadly construing the powers of first class cities, the court improperly cited other
portions of Professor Trautman's article as authority for narrow construction of the powers of first
class cities. ChemicalBank, 99 Wn. 2d at 793,666 P.2d at 340.
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nored recent case law, which had softened this narrow construction of
home rule powers.
Prior to Chemical Bank, the Washington Supreme Court had begun to
liberalize its strict interpretation of home rule powers. 80 For instance, in
City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp.,81 the court noted that the effects
of a code city's actions would extend beyond the city's limits and that the
state had passed statutes dealing with the subject matter of the city's actions. Rather than dismissing the actions due to joint state and local interest, 82 the court weighed the magnitude of the state's interest against the
83
city's home rule authority and concluded that the city could act.
In United States v. Town of North Bonneville, 84 the court did not address the joint state and local interest issue, 85 even though the case involved a complete relocation of the town. Instead, the court found that
86
North Bonneville, as a code city, had broad powers of self-government,
and thus had the authority to contract without restriction with the federal
87
government for a new town location.
The Chemical Bank court did not discuss the Issaquah and North
Bonneville decisions. The court instead applied earlier case law requiring
a stricter approach. The court should have followed Issaquah, because a
88
balancing approach would be more in line with constitutional provisions
and legislative enactments 89 which encourage broad local self-government powers. 90
D.

Summary

In Chemical Bank, the Washington Supreme Court rejected its earlier,
liberal approach toward the sources of municipal corporations' police
powers. Rather than applying generally accepted rules for construing express, implied, and home rule sources of municipal corporation authority,
80.
81.

See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
93 Wn. 2d 567, 611 P.2d 741 (1980) (suit by a television cable company to prohibit a

noncharter code city from owning and operating a cable television system).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
Issaquah, 93 Wn. 2d at 572-73, 611 P.2d at 744-45.
94 Wn.2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980).
See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
North Bonneville, 94 Wn.2d at831,621 P.2d at 129.
Id.
See, e.g., WASH CONST art. XI, § 11,discussed supra innote 69.
See, e.g.. supra note 50 and accompanying text.

90.

One strong policy argument against using a strict local-joint-paramount test of state concern

is that state legislatures seldom get around to legislating on all "state"

or "general"

concerns. A

social vacuum can be prevented only if a home rule city is allowed to impose controls on these
matters within its borders. I C. AN-rIEAO, supra note 6, § 3.08; see also id. § 3.21, at 3-59 (labelling

leads to mechanistic decisionmaking; the better approach is a balancing of state and local interests).
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the court struggled to reach a result that would invalidate the participants'
agreement. Although the unique political and economic considerations
surrounding Chemical Bank may have compelled such a result, 91 the
court's rationales for its decision will subject the actions of municipal
corporations to significant uncertainties.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE DECISION: UNCERTAINTY IN
WASHINGTON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW

The decision and reasoning of the ChemicalBank court created uncertainty over the extent of municipal corporation authority. This uncertainty
will have important impacts on all Washington municipal corporations,
the state courts, and the state legislature.
A.

Impact on Municipal CorporationDevelopment

Under municipal corporation law, one who deals with a municipal corporation is charged with knowing the extent of its authority. 92 A significant effect of the ChemicalBank analysis is that any action not backed by
the clearest express authority may be found to be ultra vires. 93 Therefore,
bond counsel will be reluctant to give a favorable opinion to-and consequently investors and contractors will be reluctant to support-municipal
projects without legislative or judicial proof of municipal authority. 94 The
end result is a bond issue that is difficult to market.
Another result of the uncertainty will be the tendency of municipal corporations to balk at innovative solutions to their problems in the absence
of a clear expression of legislative or judicial approval. Because a municipal corporation's actions are more likely to be found ultra vires under the
Chemical Bank interpretation than under liberal rules of construction, the
Chemical Bank decision provides an incentive for persons hostile to ma91.

See supranotes 29-36 and accompanying text.

92. See Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn. 2d 375, 379, 655 P.2d 245, 248 (1982); IA C. ANTIEA,
note 6, § 10.13, at 10-36; 0. REYNOLDS, supranote 7, § 187, at 647.

supra

93. The ultra vires doctrine remains applicable to municipal corporations. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn.
2d 375, 379, 655 P.2d 245, 248 (1982).
94. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The City of Seattle at 10, Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d
772, 666 P. 2d 329 (1983), No. 49868-7 (Washington Supreme Court, argued Mar. 26 1984) ("This
Court's ruling that the Washington municipal participants lacked implied statutory authority to enter
into the Participants' Agreements has clouded the opinions of bond counsel .... ); Seattle-Northwest Securities Corp., Testimony to the Washington State House Committee on Energy and Utilities
[regarding] H.B. 1556 [48th Leg., 1984 Reg. Sess.] 5 (January 31, 1984) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review) (after Chemical Bank, test cases would be required to clarify municipal

authority in some instances, and "[w]ithout a clean legal opinion, bonds could not be marketed and
issued.").

667

Washington Law Review

Vol. 59:653, 1984

jor municipal undertakings to bring a court challenge. The resulting reluctance by municipal corporations to use new approaches to problems will
discourage cooperation between municipal corporations and limit the
ways municipal corporations can solve their common problems.
B.

DeclaratoryJudgments

An increase in the number of declaratory judgments sought to validate
municipal actions should be expected due to the supreme court's narrow
interpretation in ChemicalBank. Under the general declaratory judgment
statutes, Washington courts are authorized to declare the rights, status,
and legal relationships affecting all parties to a declaratory judgment action. 95 In addition, a special declaratory judgment procedure is available
for municipal bond issues. 96 In order to satisfy hesitant investors and prevent lawsuits by citizens hostile to municipal projects, municipal corporations will increasingly use these provisions to test the validity of municipal projects. 97 The increase in declaratory judgment proceedings will add
to the crowding of court dockets, require diversion of scarce judicial resources, and cost taxpayers time and money.
C.

LegislativeImpacts

The Chemical Bank decision will also increase burdens on the legislature because municipal corporations will increasingly ask for legislative
clarification of their authority. However, the legislature's limited meeting
95.
96.

WASH REV. CODE ch. 7.24 (1983).
Id. ch. 7.25. Prior to ChemicalBank, this optional procedure apparently was rarely used. See

SPECIAL COMM ON ENERGY DEV. AND FINANCING. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. STATEOF WASH., 48th

Leg.. 1984 Reg. Sess., REPORT 5 (Jan. 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL CONM ON ENERGY].
97. For example, in South Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist. v. City of Seattle, No. 83-2-00418-3,
oral op. (Grant County Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1983), the cities of Seattle and Tacoma used the declaratory judgment procedure to validate contracts for a hydroelectric facility. In its oral opinion, the
superior court specifically mentioned the need for certainty in concluding municipal agreements. Id.
at 4. The court also found that a determination of contract validity was necessary to obtain reasonable
financing. Id. at 3-4.
In addition, policymakers have suggested that one response to the Chemical Bank decision should
be a liberalization of Washington's declaratory judgment statutes to allow even greater certainty for
municipal corporation actions. E.g., Luce Report, supra note 3, at 67.
The Washington legislature has looked at these suggestions and has proposed legislation which
allows counties, cities, and towns to test any ordinance or resolution in an expedited proceeding
before the superior court and provides direct review to the Washington Supreme Court. The proposed
legislation. Wash. H.B. 1542, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984), passed the House of Representatives
but died in a Senate committee. Washington Legislative Information Sys., Report (April 20, 1984)
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Information Sys. Report]. The
issue will be studied by the House Local Government Committee during the interim before the 1985
legislative session. See generally SPECIAL COMM- ON ENERGY. supra note 96, at 11.
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schedule 98 will cause significant time lags between problem identification
and final solutions. Also, municipal corporations will be forced to "sell"
their approaches to problem solving to legislators who may not understand or sympathize with the problems facing municipal entities. 99 And
with the great number of issues before the legislature, proper time and
attention may not be given to municipal corporation concerns. 100 Therefore, municipal corporations may be left without express authority to use
the best means to address their problems.
Further, legislation will have to be very explicit to survive a strict statutory interpretation by the courts. Rather than developing flexible statutory
schemes, the legislature will have to ensure that all contingencies are covered in enactments relating to municipal corporations. This will serve to
increase the amount of time and staff required to prepare legislation. The
ultimate result will be a legislature which is less able to function efficiently.
V.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

The mismanagement and lack of accountability by WPPSS and its participants might be offered as an example of the need for strict statutory
interpretation. This rationale is a throwback to Judge Dillon's concerns
that municipal corporations are not managed by those "best fitted by their
intelligence, business experience, capacity, and moral character."' 10
Under this rationale, the costs of strict interpretation detailed in this analysis would be considered a small price to pay for better controls on municipal corporations.
But the better reasoned and majority approach is to allow more extensive municipal corporation powers. In addition to the impacts discussed
in the analysis, reasons for liberal construction include: (1) municipal corporation officials are as capable as state legislators, (2) general distrust of
local governments is no longer the overriding concern it was at the turn of
the century, (3) the strict construction rule hampers the day-to-day opera98. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12 limits the Washington State Legislature to a 105 day regular
session in odd-numbered years and a 60 day regular session in even-numbered years.
99. One of the justifications for home rule is the lessening of log-rolling or legislative trading
common in the enactment of much local legislation. Vanlandingham, supra note 7, at 270; see Sandalow, supra note 10, at 655.
100. The great number of bills introduced during each legislative session causes a "log jam" at
session's end, the death of many meritorious bills, and inadequate consideration of other bills. See
generally Andersen, The CurrentMeaning of Home Rule in Washington, 8 WASH. PUB. POL'Y NOTES
No. 2 (1980); Sandalow, supranote 10, at 656; SUBCOMM. ON CeS. TowNs AND COUNTIES-WASH.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. HOME RULE FOR- WASHINGTON CITIES. PRELIMINARY REPORT 2 (Sept. 1957)
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
101. 1J. DILLON.supra note 24, § 9at85.
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tions of local government, and (4) local governments best understand lo02
cal problems and therefore are best suited to resolve them. 1
The failings of one municipal action should not force all municipal corporations to undergo the strict scrutiny required by the Chemical Bank
holding. This would punish the taxpayers and ratepayers of all municipal
corporations by making the actions that are subject to strict scrutiny more
expensive and time-consuming. Instead, the legislature and the supreme
court should act to cure the municipal corporation problems caused by the
Chemical Bank decision.
A.

Legislative Actions

No legislative solution by itself will solve the problems presented by
the Chemical Bank ruling. One possibility is legislation that provides a
prospective grant of power to enter into capability and "hell-or-high water" contracts. 103 Although this would alleviate the particular concerns of
municipal corporations desiring to use these contractual instruments, such
legislation would not ensure that municipal powers are broadly construed
in the future. Action beyond the granting of specific statutory powers
should be taken.
Another possible action is a statutory "reminder" to the Washington
Supreme Court of the legislature's intent that statutes relating to municipal corporations are to be construed broadly. Similarly, a signal could be
sent to the courts regarding the legislature's position on home rule authority.1 04 However, the court has either ignored' 0 5 or misapplied 10 6 similar
past expressions of legislative intent in order to reach a desired result.
102. See generally 0. REYNOLDS. supra note 7, at 97; Brachtenbach, supra note 10, at 298:
Sandalow, supra note 10, at 652-58.
103. Wash. H.B. 1556, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984) would have given municipal corporations
that develop renewable resource energy facilities and conservation improvements the express authority to use capability and 'hell-or-high water' contracts. The bill died on the House floor. Information
Sys. Report, supra note 97.
Another possibility is legislation which validates the agreements that the Washington Supreme
Court held to be ultra vires. But, such retroactive legislation would be politically unpopular and
subject to constitutional challenges. Wash. H.B. 1575, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984) would have
retroactively validated the participants' agreement. The bill died in the House Energy and Utilities
Committee. Information Sys. Report, supra note 97. See supra notes 31-32 for discussion of capability and "hell-or-high water" contracts.
104. Wash. H.B. 1160, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1984) was such a reminder. The bill provided
that: "Whenever any doubt arises about the [police power] authority of a county, city, or town to act
on a matter, it shall be construed that the county, city, or town possesses the authority to so act within
its territorial limits." After passing the House of Representatives on a 97-0 vote, House Bill 1160
died in the Senate Rules Committee. Information Sys. Report, supra note 97.
105. See. e.g., supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
106. In Chemical Bank, the court found that a statement of legislative intent that points out the
need for energy development should be interpreted to mean that the state has preempted action in this
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A third possibility is the development of a constitutional amendment
designed to strengthen the powers of municipal corporations. 107 However, constitutional provisions are also subject to judicial interpretation.
If the amendment were worded very broadly, the court could continue to
use its local-joint-paramount interest test to restrict municipal authority. 108 On the other hand, if the amendment were very specific, the court
could restrict municipal powers to those specifically listed and apply the
same rules of strict construction it currently employs in looking for implied municipal authority. 109 Finally, if a proposed constitutional amendment failed to receive voter approval, the supreme court could interpret
the failure as the will of the people that the powers of municipal corporations be interpreted very narrowly.
The legislature should clearly express its intent that Washington courts
are to broadly construe police power statutes. This would impress upon
the judiciary the legislature's position on municipal corporation statutory
construction. However, due to the discretion that the court has exercised
in applying legislative intent, true power to reform the rules of construction lies with the judicial branch.
B.

JudicialActions

In ChemicalBank, the Washington Supreme Court reverted to a nineteenth-century view of local government. Even though some judicial review of local conduct may be necessary, 110 a strict construction scheme is
no longer appropriate for regulating municipal corporations. "11
The court should take several steps to alleviate the problems it created
in Chemical Bank. First, it should adopt a rule of construction that liberally construes police power grants of authority to municipal corporations. 112 Such an action would not necessarily mean that the courts would
no longer have a role in reviewing municipal actions. Instead of reviewing municipal actions for literal compliance with enabling statutes, the
court would look at the overall impact of the actions. Additionally, liberal
rules of construction would provide municipal corporations with essential
area. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn. 2d 772, 793-94, 666 P.2d 329, 340 (1983) (interpreting
WASH. REv. CODE ch. 54.44 (1983)).
107. Brachtenbach, supra note 10, at 299; Comment, Home Rule, Revisited, 10 J. LEGIs. 231,
242 (1983) (suggests a constitutional amendment is the preferred means of strengthening home rule
authority).
108. See supranotes 7-15 and accompanying text.
109. See supranotes 25-28 and accompanying text.
110. E.g., to prevent fraud or corruption.
I l. See supranotes 92-102 and accompanying text.
112. But see supranotes 26-28, 68 and accompanying text, discussing areas where liberal construction may not be preferred. Taxation situations are one example.
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flexibility and allow them to address their problems without the negative
impacts already discussed. 113
Second, the Washington Supreme Court should take the earliest opportunity to limit Chemical Bank to its facts. The extraordinary economic
and political setting surrounding WPPSS' termination of nuclear plants 4
and 5114 makes the Chemical Bank situation unique. The approach and
result in the Chemical Bank case should not determine the approach and
result of future cases with less imposing financial and political consequences.
Third, the court should strive for consistency and clarity in applying its
rules of statutory construction. 115 Rather than cite lines of cases which
lead to a desired result, the court should distinguish between the categories of cases that require strict construction and those in which liberal
interpretation is more appropriate. The court should expressly overrule or
clearly distinguish precedent that does not conform to a liberal rule of
construction for police powers. Though overriding policy reasons for
strict construction may exist in some instances-for example in the case
of taxation powers-the court should not use this strict construction approach in situations where liberal rules are usually applied, such as police
power actions. 116
Finally, the court should once again adopt the flexible approach for
11 7
determining whether a municipal action is of local or state concern.
This flexibility would allow counties, cities, and towns a better opportunity to solve their problems without being forced to wait for legislative or
judicial action. Decisions inconsistent with the flexible approach, such as
Chemical Bank, should not be followed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Chemical Bank, the Washington Supreme Court significantly narrowed its interpretation of municipal corporation powers. This narrow
construction results in uncertainty for both private citizens dealing with
municipal corporations and the municipal corporations themselves. This
uncertainty will create burdens for the legislature and the judicial system.
113.
114.
115.

See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5-28 and accompanying text.

In an opinion released a little over a month after Chemical Bank, the supreme court expressly
applied a liberal construction to a county's bid selection process. Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l
Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wn. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983). The court did not
raise the narrow rules of construction set down in Chemical Bank or mention Chemical Bank.
116. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
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The legislature and the state courts must act to remedy these uncertainties. The legislature can remind the Washington Supreme Court of its intent that municipal corporations be given broad powers of self-government and liberal statutory interpretation. Additionally, the supreme court
should limit the ChemicalBank holding to its facts and develop a consistent, liberal approach to construing the police powers of municipal corporations. By taking these steps, the court would reduce Chemical Bank's
negative impacts and promote the resolution of municipal problems by
those most able to deal with those problems-the municipal corporations
themselves.
RichardShattuck
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